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Why Professors Hate Their Jobs: A Critique of the Ped-
agogy of Academic Disengagement 
By Jim Parsons, William Frick
Summary
This co- author article discusses the disengagement that exists between today’s pro-
fessors and their students in the classroom. This article in particular really took an  
interactive approach by including our journals reviewer’s comments, which adds for  
a great dynamic of communication between college students and professors in the  
academic world.
Introduction
Recently,  a PhD student from the University 
of Alberta completed a dissertation about the 
lives  of  professors.  Her  findings?  We  are  a 
deeply  unhappy group;  specifically,  we hate 
our  jobs.  She was shocked.  Dreaming  of  an 
academic  position  of  her 
own, and seeing the comple-
tion of her doctoral disserta-
tion as one of the final steps 
of  this  dream,  she  thought 
that  her  dreams  would  be 
shared by her soon-to-be col-
leagues.  But,  of  the profess-
ors she interviewed, only two 
said they liked being an aca-
demic.  Most  felt  caught, 
trapped,  unappreciated,  and 
powerless to find joy for their 
spirits.  Her  interviews  were 
filled with commentary about 
academic life that offered little hope and much 
despair. In fact, deep regret and cynicism per-
vaded  these  conversations.  Her  participants 
felt caught and had little idea how to get un-
caught. Her findings, if they are to be trusted, 
suggest  that  we  are  a  hope-less  lot,  deeply 
cynical,  feeling broken and battered.  Perhaps 
most  sad,  we don’t  know how to  make  our 
lives better; and, we feel like there is no time 
to get off the treadmill and try (Erfani, 2006). 
Perhaps our young colleague created an ab-
erration,  but  we think  not.  Our  own experi-
ences,  coupled with wide conversations with 
our colleagues, suggest she accidentally found 
a flaw in our armor and an illness in our spir-
its. We feel it around us, and 
we also fear we are less than 
adequately  prepared  to  fend 
off  this  erosion  to  our  own 
immune  systems.  Although 
we  have  few  answers,  we 
hope  this  article,  in  a  naïve 
way,  might  engender  a  con-
versation about this topic as a 
way  of  engaging  the  specter 
directly. Our work together is 
an  attempt  to  find  a  process 
that,  by  its  nature,  addresses 
some  of  the  issues  we  will 
raise.  In  addition  to  dia-
loguing with each other as we have engaged 
this work, our work has been shared with re-
viewers engaged in the adjudication of articles 
for this journal. The reviewers’ comments, in 
themselves, represent additional conversations 
generated by colleagues interested in this top-
ic.  Specifically,  in  addition  to necessary cri-
tique of our ideas, these reviewers suggested 
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additional readings they believed would add to 
our knowledge; and, in our “academic negoti-
ations” towards publication of our ideas in an 
article for this journal, we have used their sug-
gestions and insights to push our work further. 
At its basic level, our work together as writers 
and reviewers is one communicative aspect of 
academic  journals  –  a  conversation  between 
working colleagues.  In light of this focus on 
engendering a conversation around the current 
state of the professorship, we have chosen to 
include  some  reviewer  comments  within  the 
article  as  a  way  to  collectively  engage  the 
specter we sense so deeply within ourselves.
Before we begin, we hope to outline our task 
transparently. Because we are working toward 
understanding  through  communication,  we 
will  use  Habermas’  (1984)  four  kinds  of 
claims  to  validity  as  our  guide.  Habermas 
notes  that  presenters  must  (a)  present  some-
thing  understandable  (semantics  and 
grammar);  (b)  give  the  hearer  something  to 
understand [speak the truth about a situation 
external to both us (speakers) and you (hear-
ers)]; (c) make oneself thereby understandable 
(make our claims to truthfulness so as we be-
come trustworthy); and (d) come to an under-
standing  with  another  person  (a  claim  for 
“normative rightness” by choosing something 
that fits within the framework of social norms 
forming  the  background  to  the  interpersonal 
situation). This fourth claim to validity seems 
particularly powerful to us, because by its en-
acting we are attempting in our small way to 
work  towards  a  solution  to  the  problem  of 
which we speak. And, here is the cart before 
the horse. Basically,  we believe that the best 
way to overcome what we see as a culture of 
disengagement  is  to  engage  with  each  other 
socially and truthfully about it.
This article is an attempt to explore what we 
see  as  a  sad  state  of  affairs.  What  seems 
doubly sad to us is the irony of it all: the jobs 
we have are the jobs we aspired for, and this is 
the work we hoped would be both intellectu-
ally and socially stimulating. Why we should 
come to despair in this work is worth consid-
ering publicly.  Certainly,  there are pragmatic 
reasons:  most  of  us  find  ourselves  in  direct 
collegial competition for what seem like finite 
resources – research monies and yearly incre-
ments.  Plus,  the  work  can  be  difficult  and 
lonely  (no  one  we  know  evaluates  and  cri-
tiques  students’  work at  the  pub as  a  social 
event),  and  the  will  wanes.  There  is  the 
drudgery of grading the same paper dozens of 
times.  In  the  lonely  spirit  of  Don Juan,  our 
writing and research articles can seem like so 
much piecework – a sort of Dickens’ morality 
drama where  we feel  we are  dragging more 
chains than Jacob Marley. 
We  noted  that  our  thinking  (on  paper)  is 
both nascent (to us) and quite possibly naïve 
in  the  appraisal  of  others,  and  we  our  col-
leagues have told us so. But we wish things 
were  different,  and  we  hope  beginning  this 
discussion might be a forum to help. Here is 
our hope: we believe underneath the surface of 
these dis-eased activities are deeper afflictions 
– one that a hopeful pedagogy might help. We 
are  going to,  in this  article,  theorize that  we 
are living in a world (the academy) – which is, 
in  fact,  a  logical  system  where  the  current 
activities and the beliefs of academics are both 
symptomatic  and  expressive  of  a  pedagogy 
and a philosophical culture that centers on the 
politics of disengagement and leaves academ-
ics on the whole with an overwhelming angst 
that approaches nihilism – where there is noth-
ing to act upon and, even if there were, we feel 
powerless to act. We will address this lack of 
efficaciousness by intersecting two areas of in-
quiry and practice: pedagogy and philosophy.
An Apologetic about Pedagogy
We believe we have been schooled into this 
culture of disengagement and we seem to be-
lieve the desks are fixed to the floor. We use 
the concept “pedagogy” to explain this culture 
because we believe it has been a part of our 
Culture Society and Praxis
ISSN: 1544-3159
2
Culture, Society, and Praxis, Vol. 7, No. 2 [2008], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/csp/vol7/iss2/6
Parsons, Jim. Frick, William Why Professors Hate Their Jobs.- 32
schooling – it  has been leading us. And, we 
will  contrast  a  pedagogy  of  disengagement 
with  another  pedagogy  we  will  call  a  ped-
agogy  of  engagement.  We  understand  these 
concepts to be both simple and perhaps pro-
vocative. Yet, we hope that our simplistic and 
exploratory article  might  help  to  engender  a 
deeper conversation about the lives we live in 
the academy. Should we be able to begin this 
conversation,  we  believe  that  we  will  have 
moved  a  step  toward  engendering  a  healing 
missive that might help us thoughtfully attend 
to  our  own  positive  ends.  We  are  also  re-
minded that pedagogy can be understood in a 
variety of ways – from public policy discourse 
that  contains  particular  ideological  perspect-
ives designed to influence popular opinion to 
institutional  and organizational  practices  and 
structures  that  serve educative  purposes and, 
by  doing  so,  socialize  and  normalize  parti-
cipants. 
In our attempt to question fundamental  as-
sumptions,  we trust  Alfred North Whitehead 
(1925)  who,  in  Science  and  the  Modern 
World, noted that those who critique a culture 
should not attend to intellectual positions that 
historians  feel  it  necessary  explicitly  to  de-
fend. More important for a deep understanding 
of  a  culture  are  those  fundamental  assump-
tions  that  adherents  of  the  systems  uncon-
sciously presuppose. Such assumptions appear 
so obvious that people do not know what they 
are assuming. Indeed, they do not know they 
are assuming anything because no other way 
of putting things has ever occurred to them. In 
this article, we are trying to put things “anoth-
er way” so that we might come to understand 
the culture of the academy as a world of myth, 
hegemony, and conflict.
The world of the academy is a “secondary 
world,” in the sense that the Middle Earth is, 
for Tolkien, a secondary world. It is a mytho-
poeia. The  sine qua non of creating myths is 
that a world can resemble another world, but 
not  really  be  that  other  world  –  a  world 
mirrored  through  the  looking  glass.  And,  in 
many ways, for those of us who live there, the 
academy is the academy and the rest (the non-
academy)  is  the  Muggle  world.  There  is  a 
clearly demarcated wholeness to the academy 
– it possesses an internal logic and self-con-
sistency.  It  has  its  own  peculiar  rules  that 
shape  the  lives  of  those who live  and work 
there; and, it is these rules we are attempting 
to critique because we believe these rules are 
growing  toxic  to  its  inhabitants.  Perhaps,  to 
extend the metaphor, we are writing this art-
icle as a self-defense against the Dark Arts. 
Contrasting Pedagogies
    There are Jeremiads1 and there are invita-
tions to act differently.  We hope ours is  the 
latter. Invitations to act differently come in all 
cultures. Islam is short on theology and long 
on practice,  believing for example that pros-
trating one’s self and giving alms will habitu-
ate edifying patterns of actions towards others. 
The  story  of  the  first  Christmas,  angels  an-
nounced the birth of the “Child” and, by doing 
so, invited humans to a responsibility to live 
differently. This same onus is alluded to in the 
Japanese  expression  of  thank  you  –  which 
translated means, almost literally “it is a heavy 
weight  you  give  to  me.”  We  feel  a  similar 
need to create an enabling myth that calls aca-
demics to participate in some disruptively pos-
itive changes to our prevailing culture. 
We are calling for all of us to work through, 
as Pope John Paul II calls it, a “philosophy of 
action.” This philosophy of action obliges us 
to create and express a vision for a pedagogy 
of  engagement.  The  vision  demands  some-
thing of us, as teachers and academics, and at-
tests to the moral courage required to under-
stand  our  work  as  precondition,  means,  and 
1 A Jeremiad is a long literary work (almost as long 
as Freddie Mercury’s “Bohemian Rhapsody”), prose 
or poetry, in which the author laments the state of so-
ciety and its morals in a serious tone of sustained in-
vective. Usually, the work contains a prophecy of so-
ciety's imminent downfall. We aspire through our 
missive to be more hopeful.
CS&P Vol 7. Num 2 Fall 2008
3
Parsons and Frick: Why Professors Hate Their Jobs: A Critique of the Pedagogy of Aca
Published by Digital Commons @ CSUMB, 2008
33 Why Professors Hate Their Jobs CS&P
end to a fulfillment of human purpose. To help 
us  define  this  pedagogy  of  engagement,  we 
ask  this  guiding  question:  What  are  people 
for? And, we answer that,  to us, there is no 
mystery: We are for each other in community 
(Berry, 1990).
To help a reader understand what we mean 
by the concept pedagogy of engagement,  we 
contrast  our  idea  with  what  we  will  call  a 
“pedagogy of disengagement.” In their simpli-
city,  these phrases  appear  to  us  to  represent 
distinct paradigms and, as ideas, become help-
ful  to  deconstruct  the  tenets  of  individual 
philosophical  positions  about  the  nature  of 
teaching and the corresponding purposes of an 
academic life.  What is the goal of teaching? 
Our answer is that  teaching is a way of life 
based in community (teachers and students to-
gether) and invokes a pedagogy based on rela-
tional  sharing  rather  than  hierarchical  (or 
status-imbued) pronouncing. The end is a hol-
istic shared life in community; it is not the res-
cue  of  students  from  ignorance.  Teaching 
finds its full meaning in a community of rela-
tionship,  reconciliation,  and  justice.  And  as 
the reviewers of this article have made clear, 
justice  is  an  elusive  idea.  We  acknowledge 
this  insight,  especially  as  it  pertains  to  the 
teaching context. Although we speak of justice 
(and injustice),  we are guided by notions  of 
justice as emancipation, not only for our stu-
dents but for ourselves. This notion of justice 
as emancipation will hopefully be evident to 
the reader.
Education and Schooling
Paulo Freire (2007) would tell us that teach-
ing, in addition to sharing, is a vocational op-
portunity to raise critical consciousness for the 
learner. The teacher, in community with oth-
ers, practices so as to mobilize persons, to free 
persons from domination and oppression – to 
set learners on a different life-course because 
of  newly-acquired  thinking,  attitudes,  skills 
and dispositions. Teaching, then, finds its full 
meaning in a community of liberated (broadly 
construed) persons who have dedicated them-
selves to reconciliation, justice (broadly con-
strued),  discourse,  mutual  dependence,  col-
lective interests beyond the limited parameters 
of  individual  and/or  collective  identity,  and 
peace.  And peace,  as  Howard John Loewen 
(1985) tells us, is a transformational grammar.
That we would place so much importance on 
how we educate each other might seem odd, 
but as Hodgkinson (1991) tells us, “Education 
is something very special  in the field of hu-
man affairs” (p.15). Assuming a constellation 
of purposes and instilled with idealistic faith, 
“education has about it a…humanistic quality 
which renders it distinctive and special among 
the occupations of [humanity]” (Hodgkinson, 
1991, p. 23). The purposes of education and 
schooling as a formal institution in particular, 
are rooted in human desires and values. As an 
institution, schooling “seeks to serve…its cli-
entele by altering the world in such a way as 
to realize those values” (p. 26) and, as such, 
education  broadly  conceived,  formal  school-
ing in general, and teaching in particular be-
comes a humanistic, idealistic, and moral pur-
suit. 
Schooling is special (unique) because, com-
pared to other social institutions that exist to 
ensure  a  primary  purpose  rooted  in  value, 
schooling encompasses a constellation of hu-
manistic values ranging from aesthetic happi-
ness,  to  ideological  transmission,  to  instru-
mental  economic  gain.  Education  is,  in  one 
sense,  “the  most  general  human  pursuit” 
(Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 27) centering its work 
on the basic value of fulfillment, and itself a 
precondition to the fulfillment of other human 
purposes. “It  is  this  all-inclusive quality that 
makes education so special” and posits it with 
a relevance to all aspects of the human condi-
tion (Hodgkinson, 1991, p, 27).
By way of schooling, students are inducted 
into the beliefs, values, customs, and cultural 
tools of our particular society; depend upon it 
for  their  economic  livelihood;  and  acquire 
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from it appreciations and sentiments that con-
tribute to our quality of life. The endeavor is 
profoundly moral.  Hence,  because the enter-
prise is so special, or uniquely moral, teaching 
and  leading  for  the  enterprise  is  special  as 
well. It is a “moral art” (Hodkinson, 1991). 
Differences between Pedagogies of Engage-
ment and Pedagogies of Disengagement
The distinction between these pedagogies rests 
profoundly in one simple critique: how do we 
treat others? Note that others are always im-
plied in our critique. To us, education is a vo-
cation that implies one’s actions with others – 
in some way or form. Ergo, it is in how we en-
gage the other(s) that defines our pedagogical 
actions. That said, we associate words, charac-
teristics,  or  characterological  virtues  such as 
compassion, empathy, respect, humility, open-
ness,  and dialogue  with  a  pedagogy of  “en-
gagement.” In dialogues of both words and ac-
tions,  we associate  words,  characteristics,  or 
characterological virtues such as pity,  mono-
logue,  arrogance,  exclusivism,  and  intrusion 
with a pedagogy of disengagement.
“Disengagement”  assumes  imposition,  pat-
ronization, paternalism, and cultural arrogance 
that  results  in  ignorance  (we  ignore  others’ 
needs and persons) and presumption (we pre-
sume to  know and understand others’  needs 
and persons). Such acts, in both cases, might 
be  undertaken  for  noble  intentions.  But,  re-
gardless  of  how  well-intended  the  actions 
might  be,  the “intentionality2” of the actions 
creates the philosophy of how we relate to oth-
ers. “Engagement” assumes dialogical possib-
ility,  active gratitude,  transformation through 
community (common unity), and loving eman-
cipation. 
Disengagement
2 We will discuss the difference between intentional-
ity and acts with intention later in the article.
When we speak to our graduate students, they 
seem to have few complaints; and, when we 
recall  our own graduate education,  we recall 
caring  mentors  and  supervisors.  That  said, 
when we look back at  what  happens to  our 
students and what happened to us (the totality 
of our experience), we see that something else 
has  also concomitantly occurred;  we learned 
to accept the world of the academy as “nor-
mal” and to fit into our tasks there without cri-
tique – without a sense of this culture having 
the potential for domination. We will explicate 
this culture more specifically later; suffice it to 
say, we believe a pedagogy of disengagement 
has sharply increased recently based in large 
part  upon an institutional  culture of domina-
tion. 
When Jim, who has been an academic staff 
member  at  the  University  of  Alberta  since 
1976, speaks with his aging colleagues at the 
University  of  Alberta,  they  often  fall  into 
“Camelot  talk,”  recalling  the  glory  days  of 
their  Department and reveling in how things 
“used to  be3”  and,  of  course,  are  no longer. 
And, there is honesty in this talk – things are 
less collegial  now than they were 30+ years 
ago4. We believe that the difference lies in the 
3 It was not uncommon, in the mid-1970s to all have 
coffee together twice a day – 10:30 am and 2:30 pm. 
When one person moved, almost every young pro-
fessor met to help. Weekends were spent together in 
families. Christmas parties of whole Departments 
were held in rented halls with 300+ attendees, with 
singing and comedy and talent shows. Obviously, 
other things have occurred to change these social 
communities; but, we attest that some of the things 
that have happened to reshape these events and this 
convivial attitude have to do with things outside of 
society’s sociological occurrences. We believe some 
things are systemic – competition for what seem like 
finite research dollars; strong personal competition 
for salary and promotion; and an academic culture 
driven by less than convivial philosophical ground-
ings – and the things that go with that [such as a per-
sonal lack of efficacy and fullness that makes us, 
shall we say, edgy (on edge)].
4 We do, however, believe that those graduate student 
supervisors who acted in ways characterized by the 
old idea are no longer in the main. The saying was, at 
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relationship between colleagues and the rela-
tionship between being an academic and the 
tasks  of  teaching,  research,  and other  know-
ledge-building activities. 
A  dichotomy  of  life  is  characterized  in 
graduate school education (learning and teach-
ing).  One  can  become a  scholar  and,  at  the 
same  time,  become  a  “true  believer”  in  the 
culture; one can learn from research5, and can 
learn to be a researcher - including the hier-
archical  rules  that  place  one  over  others  – 
competition  for  publication  in  the  “right” 
journals, acceptance of a finite amount of ma-
terial  resources  (competition  for  funding), 
competition for salary increments and promo-
tion based upon “productivity”  – all  can be-
come clearly conformed to a paradigm of dis-
engagement. Now we talk about our “heroes” 
by  noting  that  “she  was  published  in  that 
journal” or “he just received a huge research 
award.” These are our icons; but, is their work 
edifying anyone – including themselves? Two 
cases  in  point:  (1)  conversations  with  col-
leagues,  especially  throughout  the  US,  note 
the difficulty of gaining tenure and a common 
(n of a few) theme – “I worked so hard to gain 
tenure, and after I got it I quit working” and 
(2) a “confession” (although meant as sound 
strategy)  from  an  icon,  who  stated  “I  try, 
every two years, to get one article published in 
….(enter  the  name  of  an  important  journal 
here). That is the only article I write. I could 
publish more, but I know the game. I quit do-
ing research I was interested in and started to 
figure out a year ahead what topic would be 
‘hot’.” To us, this person seems more sad than 
least at the University of Texas, “The first paper the 
graduate student publishes contains the name of the 
supervisor only; the second paper has the supervisor’-
s name as main author and the graduate student as 
second author; the third has the graduate student as 
main author with the supervisor second; and, finally, 
the fourth paper contains only the graduate student’s 
name as single author.
5 It is profound how deeply philosophical research 
foundations can lead us – engaging notions of epi-
stemology, axiology, and ontology. There is a life-
time of work explicating this area.
happy – strategy has replaced the joy of dis-
covery  and  creation.  Are  we  teaching  our 
graduate students to thrive in a pedagogy of 
disengagement and, perhaps more disturbing, 
to accept and believe this is the way academic 
life should be lived6?
The disengagement of which we speak takes 
many forms. For example, in our own institu-
tions  it  would  be  hard  to  argue  against  the 
growth in self-assertion, self-protection, form-
ational separations, isolation, alienation, self-
repression of thought, lack of space and time 
to engage in shared ideas, and lack of agency 
directed toward impulses toward community. 
We see a self-centered core as a basis of our 
human activities and the organizational polit-
ics  writ  individually  on  human  actions.  For 
example, it is not uncommon to hear honestly 
thoughtful professors strategizing to “capture” 
for them what seem like finite resources and 
rewards – as manifested in research grants and 
annual increments toward salary. A first-year 
education professor recently noted recently he 
had declined a chance to work with teachers in 
schools  because  his  job  was  to  “think  and 
write theoretically, and engage in his own the-
oretical research” – which he implied was re-
search done while being sequestered on cam-
pus, clearly outside the more common (vulgar) 
activities of teachers and students in schools. 
Or, at a recent presentation, a first-year pro-
fessor critiqued her student teacher for not be-
ing able to see the systemic and structural in-
equities present in the classroom and for only 
wishing to  engage in  conversation about  the 
student  teacher  evaluation.  The  professor’s 
critique was based upon a theoretical  frame-
6 Pope John Paul II would probably suggest that the 
antipathy here would stem from people choosing 
lower values over higher values. His philosophical 
work outlining values hierarchies suggests that lower 
values (such as materialism) are finite and conflicts 
over these lower values exist, in part, because of their 
finite nature. If I get this resource, you cannot. On the 
other hand, a higher value (such as conviviality or 
community) has no limits – that is we all can enjoy as 
much of it as we desire without denying that others 
experience it as well.
Culture Society and Praxis
ISSN: 1544-3159
6
Culture, Society, and Praxis, Vol. 7, No. 2 [2008], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/csp/vol7/iss2/6
Parsons, Jim. Frick, William Why Professors Hate Their Jobs.- 36
work which posited that meaning resided en-
tirely in language and who failed to see she 
was engaging a culture (schools) where mean-
ing did not lie in language, but in action. We 
are  not  arguing  that  this  colleague  was  not 
well-meaning.  But  her  manner  was  condes-
cending and ignored the very idea of cultures 
she  was  engaging  theoretically.  She  was 
watching a “student teacher” (where does lan-
guage live in this nouned concept?) and this 
student teacher  could only seem to focus on 
her own performance and could not seem to 
see the structural violence perpetrated on the 
class  by  patterns  of  behavior.  What  seems 
grossly  unfair  about  this  “story”  is  that  the 
colleague did not seem to recognize the sys-
tem of structural blindness perpetrated by the 
system of scrutiny and evaluation inherent in 
how the university constructed the visit in the 
first place – and the student teachers’ fatalistic 
codependence upon that system: “You are sit-
ting in my class, making notes. Now you are 
sitting me down to talk seriously about me – 
this must be about my performance. After all, 
you were an audience to me – with the stu-
dents,  you  faced only me,  watching,  noting, 
and ‘judging’. Now you will talk to me, and I 
know exactly the text and context of this talk – 
what else could be happening here? What else 
can this be but performance anxiety? Who are 
you kidding that this is about whether I saw 
any structural  oppression  of  students?  I  was 
teaching about adverbs.”
Certainly,  at the same time, many of these 
same  thoughtful  people  decry  hypocritical 
activities of others or spend time academically 
analyzing the complex adaptive nature of hu-
man and natural systems. This critique is not 
“to throw the first stone” at these young pro-
fessors, but instead to blame us all who have 
lived in the academy. It is also to explain the 
complexity  of  the  issues  that  face  us.  We 
didn’t mean for all this to happen; but some-
thing did happen rather  quickly to us in the 
past thirty years, and the happening is power-
fully consumptive.  Thus, we engage in “per-
sonal university” activities – though separate 
from  the  discourse  of  our  academic  know-
ledge – that help build ideologies that rational-
ize  a  certain  kind of  poverty of spirit  and a 
systemic “legalism” that enforces a socioeco-
nomic order that can, and does, entrap us.
    The university is hardly a simple institu-
tion, and the academy is a complex concept7. 
Both  university  and academy are  filled  with 
“office,” hierarchy, rewards and punishments, 
spirits and ghosts, institution, ideology, icons, 
religious  belief,  and tradition.  We encounter 
these in slogans, symbols, and the ways we or-
ganize  our  social  and  our  work  activities. 
These define and dictate the modes of our cul-
tural  patterns and relationships.  They define, 
for  us,  justice,  wisdom,  social  values,  the 
meaning of humanity,  the status and roles of 
individuals, and the nature of our interactions. 
They provide us rationalization for our social 
orders.  In short,  they dominate because they 
form a system of domination we seldom think 
to challenge. 
Although this system is a human construct, 
it is not always a conscious human construct; 
yet,  it  inevitably instructs us and serves as a 
basis for a pedagogy of disengagement. Here, 
the  system  as  academy  behaves  immorally 
(Niebuhr, 1932), while singular souls within it 
struggle, and often fail (even of their own do-
ing), to find another way to seek and live out a 
pedagogy of engagement that ultimately leads 
to hope. The systematic domination defines us 
a human actors – it takes on a life, identity, set 
of goals, and a dynamic all its own.
We have argued that a pedagogy of disen-
gagement inhibits those of us who work in the 
academy. The inhibitors we have seen include 
(1) fatalism (no matter what is done, the end is 
determined);  (2)  depression  of  spirit  (an un-
derlying discouragement about life); (3) self-
7 Were we further in our analysis, we would probably 
be more fastidious in making sure that when we use 
the term university we use it to mean the place/site of 
our work, and when we use the word academy we use 
it to mean the conceptual idea of that site. But, early 
in our work we are not quite sure what to choose.
CS&P Vol 7. Num 2 Fall 2008
7
Parsons and Frick: Why Professors Hate Their Jobs: A Critique of the Pedagogy of Aca
Published by Digital Commons @ CSUMB, 2008
37 Why Professors Hate Their Jobs CS&P
deprecation (believing oneself a loser who is 
unable to function in the culture); (4) a sense 
of  powerlessness  resulting  from internalized 
oppression (one comes to believe and act as if 
the “oppressor’s beliefs and values express a 
reality that must be lived); (5) structures and 
values that have created a hegemony (we are 
unable to visualize options to our actions and 
lives); and, (6) self-centered fear that justifies 
deceitful  and  manipulative  behavior  (if  we 
don’t out-produce, cheat, violate, or win over 
others, we will suffer).
Engagement
We believe many of us are wounded and live 
in a wounded system. We would like to sug-
gest a different path, to take initiative in this 
wounded world, and to work to reconcile its 
violent, unjust, and abusive patterns. Our goal 
is to introduce a life of engagement as a real 
human possibility, as a truly new paradigm or 
the return of an old paradigm8. This paradigm 
of “enculturalization” can become the goal of 
teaching.  By  encluturalization,  we  mean  the 
process of passing, from one generation to an-
other  generation,  through  formal  education 
and broader socialization,  the chosen aspects 
of a “life,” a life lived out in relation to the 
learner. This process works to integrate cultur-
al  characteristics  in  intended  or  accidental 
8 We once read that Immanuel Kant would nightly 
dine with his graduate students, and during these 
evenings talk, play games, and take walks. Regard-
less of what one thinks of Kant’s philosophy, he ob-
viously had a graciousness of spirit (or, in those days, 
an accommodating wife). We suspect, using the 
is/ought cosmology, that these graduate students also 
learned from these occasions about how life was and 
should be. It is not hard, as well, to find readings 
where the begetting of academics: for example, Jef-
freys (2004) notes the work of Franz Brentano and 
indicates that Edmund Husserl was one of Brentano’s 
students who criticized and developed Brentano’s 
work; Edith Stein was one of Edmund Husserl’s stu-
dents, whose work was influenced by Husserl; and 
that Dietrich von Hildebrand studied with Husserl, 
developing his thought in important ways. The point 
is that we don’t seem to live this way anymore.
ways  through  prolonged  socialization  within 
the  bounds  of  a  distinct  cultural  context. In 
other  words,  we  are  always  teaching  more 
than we are teaching – our systems speak as 
loudly as our words. The moral enterprise then 
becomes as, Louis Luzbetak’s (1963) applied 
anthropology  notes  that,  cooperation,  rather 
than manipulation, works to influence a soci-
ety’s pattern of behavior.
The value of community – or common unity 
–  is  shared  “people-centered”  activity.  It  is 
much  easier  to  dominate  and control.  When 
only one voice speak, there is great external 
clarity. But clarity is not the goal of teaching; 
transformation,  in  our  view,  is  the  goal  of 
teaching (Mezirow, 2000). A teacher must be 
“catalytic.”  As  chemists  tell  us,  a  catalytic 
agent  induces a change without confounding 
or altering the molecular structure of the host 
elements. 
Catalysis  is  the process  of modification  or 
releasing  the  host  elements  from  inhibitive 
structures that act as obstructions; by doing so, 
ultimately but indirectly, one induces intrinsic 
changes in the host elements. The “inhibitive 
structures” of life are manifold, and teaching’s 
highest moral pursuit is to both modify and re-
lease the learner from domination. The trans-
formative teaching life that is engagement is 
one  keenly  aware. As  Vaclav  Havel  (1985) 
tells us, a better system does not automatically 
ensure a better life. In fact, he suggests, only 
creating a better life can develop a better sys-
tem. Or put differently by the patriarchs:
He has told you, O man, what is good; And 
what does the Lord require of you But to do 
justice,  to  love  kindness,  And  to  walk 
humbly with your God?  (Micah 6:8)
Dialogue is a method of social catalysis. First, 
it is an ideal. Second, it is a relationship. Only 
third  is  it  an  activity.  And this  activity  is  a 
common unity open and respectful of partner-
ship  –  a  partnership  implied  by  Habermas’ 
(1984) four claims to validity we noted earlier. 
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The goal of a teacher  is to help awaken the 
students  to  possibilities  within  their  reach. 
One step is working together to eliminate un-
just structures that are hegemonic within a cul-
ture,  and replacing  these  with  an  alternative 
consciousness. The work must be done, in the 
Freirian  sense,  within  a  dialogical  construct 
and organization – given to extended blocks of 
time. Dialogue, understood as such, becomes 
the  transformative  tool  of  the  fully-present 
teacher.  John  Dewey  (1938)  noted  that  the 
means contain and condition the ends. There-
fore,  the centrality of dialogue as means be-
comes  the Habermasian  discourse  where  the 
moral  and ethical  (in  part)  is  determined  by 
the interactive process between persons. As an 
activity, it encourages the literacy of possibil-
ities.
In a transformative paradigm, human inter-
vention is indirect and vicarious. It is indirect 
in the sense that we cannot go into a situation 
with a set of pre-constructed solutions that we 
impose on the situation. It is vicarious in the 
sense that we must become partners with those 
whom we would seek to serve as guides and 
facilitators of dialogical space. We, as teach-
ers, serve our students. 
As  servants,  we must  take  upon ourselves 
the basic cultural identity of those whom we 
would  serve.  We  must  incarnate  our  work 
with stories and cultures that our students un-
derstand.  Then,  we must  participate  together 
with the goal of creating an engaged and re-
conciled community. Aristotle ~334-323 BCE 
(1989)  noted that humans are social  animals 
distinguished  by  rationality.  Though  philo-
sophers through the ages have worked to dis-
count Aristotle, in at least one sense Aristotle 
is correct. Social cooperation, based on friend-
ship and mutual self-interest,  is rational – in 
that it makes sense when you consider it. As 
we engage the culture, and the learners within 
it, we need to view it emically – from the in-
side  –  rather  than  imposing  foreign  cultural 
norms and meanings  from the outside as an 
immediate  basis  of  judgment.  We must  also 
note that we are part of that culture. To put it 
simply,  to  act  vocationally  as  a  teacher  we 
need a pedagogy of engagement that implies 
“consideration of” the presence of others.
A Critique of Philosophy
We believe that one reason academics are un-
happy is because their lives are lived embed-
ded within philosophies that do not allow the 
possibility of efficacious agency. That is, we 
are critiquing those late 20th century and the 
early  21st century  philosophies  that  seem to 
have captured our minds while simultaneously 
chaining us to often-unexamined fundamental 
values. These values grind our ethical action 
to a halt. As simply as we can state it, seldom 
are  there  ethical  places  to  go  from  neither 
these philosophies nor little reason to try. We 
believe that at the heart of current educational 
philosophies,  such  as  some  writers  in  com-
plexity science and some branches of critical 
theory,  are  the  beliefs  that  humans  are  not 
agents,  cannot  be  willful  in  making  change, 
and cannot be involved in “human acts”. We 
can only be involved in “actions that happen 
to humans.” Agency disappears with the post-
structural  deconstruction  of  any morally  im-
bued meta-narrative. 
For example, postmodern and post-structural 
thought has led to increasingly declaim ideo-
logical commitments about the value of meta-
narratives.  Consider  the  ontological  relation-
ship  between  concepts  of  personal  narrative 
(which  allow  an  intrinsic  human  telos)  and 
their groundings in meta-narratives. Is it pos-
sible to have personal narratives without meta-
narratives? How does an “actor” come to gain 
a sense of purpose (divine or otherwise, and 
what  sense  of  purpose  lacks  divinity?)  that 
constitutes movement towards creating a per-
sonally meaningful human life? 
There is  general  agreement  that  social  and 
technological changes of the 20th and now 21st 
century  were  born  of  modernist  temper  but 
paradoxically  eroded key modernist  assump-
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tions,  particularly  those  regarding  personal 
agency, personal value, and instrumental reas-
on.  Feminist  scholars  (e.g.,  Luepnitz,  1988) 
have added their own critique of implicit pa-
ternalism that works to reestablish power hier-
archies without considering disparities experi-
enced between women and men. Many critical 
philosophies have engaged extensive debates 
about the nature of power hidden within ac-
cepted practices. Post-structural “life” has re-
jected meta-narratives on ideological grounds, 
suggesting  that  broad  understandings  em-
braced by a  culture  that  form inherited  con-
texts and meanings should give way to more 
particular narratives that individuals may tell 
about their cultures and about themselves. 
Writings  by  critics  such  as  Jean-Francois 
Lyotard  (1979/1984)  and  Michel  Foucault 
(1980) have gone hand-in-hand with a belief 
in social constructionism that questions many 
established  and comfortable  ideas.  Anderson 
(1997) suggests that postmodern thought rep-
resents  a  broad  challenge  to  and  a  cultural 
shift  away from fixed  meta-narratives,  priv-
ileged  discourses,  universal  truths,  objective 
reality,  language as representational,  and the 
scientific criterion of knowledge as objective 
and fixed. Whether these are true or not true 
(ironically) is not our point: instead, our point 
is  that  these  critiques  are  uncomfortable 
spaces to live – hope and purpose is disrupted.
So,  when  Lyotard  (1979/1984,  p.  xxiv) 
defines the postmodern temper as “incredulity 
toward  metanarratives”  and  Foucault  (White 
&  Epston,  1990)  talks  of  “privileged  dis-
courses,”  we  are  left  uncomfortable  in  the 
wake  of  this  accusation  that  seems  to  point 
directly to us. Basically we know that society 
allows the ivory-towered academy (and those 
of us who live there) to exist and engage in the 
modernist  temperament  of  engaging in  priv-
ileged discourse. Furthermore, consider where 
the postmodern narrative of “social construc-
tionism,” as defined by the following all but 
universally accepted four ideas, really puts us: 
(1) realities are socially constructed; (2) realit-
ies are constituted using language; (3) realities 
are organized and maintained using narrative; 
and  (4)  there  are  no  essential  truths.  One 
might be tempted to cynically ask: if there is 
no essential  truth and we are left  to socially 
construct  our  own  realities,  why  can’t  we 
seem  to  construct  a  reality  that  makes  us 
happy? 
Our theorizing is not utilitarian, nor do we 
presuppose  that  the  “facts”  we  describe  are 
valueless. Instead, we espouse a set of values 
and the normative conclusions that arise from 
those  said  and  described  facts,  based  upon 
what  we  see  as  a  chasm  between  “is”  and 
“ought.” We also believe that our facts (what 
we know) already contain our values. We be-
lieve this is true of the entire academy, which 
will make the quest to reclaim a greater pres-
ence  with our  vocations  all  that  much  more 
difficult.  Similar  to  pragmatists  such  as 
Richard Rorty (1991), we believe there is a so-
cial  construction  to  the  knowledge  in  which 
we live and work and that we have had a hand 
in this construction. We also believe that this 
is why the quest to reclaim a greater engage-
ment with our vocations is even possible. 
This stance, and the knowledge claims that 
assess action in situ, is inherently ethical. The 
stance is ethical because it recognizes and el-
evates  human  agency.  Our desire  to  explain 
might put us out of step with many colleagues, 
but we believe that drawing word pictures of 
the  issues  will  help us  understand our  diffi-
culties.  Like  Sokolowski  (2000),  we believe 
that  “the core  doctrine  in  phenomenology is 
the  teaching  that  every act  of  consciousness 
we perform and every experience that we have 
is intentional: it is essentially ‘conscious of,’ 
or an ‘experience of’ something or other” (p. 
8). We are then saying that intentional acts of 
engagement will help us improve our work.
We are also saying that there is intentional-
ity to the philosophies in which we engage. In-
tentionality is the general orientation of con-
sciousness  toward  objects.  Daniel  Dennett 
(1997) suggests that intentionality has an in-
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voluntary  and  we  suggest  learned  (even 
though  that  learning  might  remain  uncon-
scious) element. Intentionality is the way our 
minds simply (and without conscious meaning 
to) focus on the thousands of things that hap-
pen to us every day – the common ways we 
live in our world. 
Sokolowski (2000) suggests that involuntary 
intentionality makes  our minds “public,”  be-
cause this intentionality connects us to things 
in the social  world and allows us to explore 
how things are revealed to us in structures that 
shape consciousness. In other words, what we 
believe without conscious acts of the will es-
sentially  shapes  how we  react  to  our  social 
world. Going back to Whitehead (1925), these 
are the things we take for granted. Our point is 
that, if we engage the social world essentially 
as victims (“acts that happen to humans”) and 
things happen to us without connection to our 
ability to shape them, the acridness of victim-
hood comes to overwhelm us in a deep psy-
chological  cynicism,  from which there is  no 
escape  and  no rational  choice  except  to  be-
come deeply unhappy.
Because  we  believe  we  socially  construct 
our world, the knowledge that proceeds from 
construction  always  has  intentionality.  It 
shapes us. In Thomistic terms, operation fol-
lows being.9 Our conscious  actions  originate 
in our persons. Our being is needed because, 
without it, we fall victim to the “subjectivism 
and relativism” characterizing much of mod-
ern  philosophy  (Jeffreys,  2004,  p.  42).  This 
subjectivism finds itself grounded in a sort of 
solipsism of self-evident individuality. That is, 
we live in a system that expects us to act, as 
academics,  for  our  selves  in  the  business  of 
self-promotion and means that we act against 
community and the agency of actions in those 
communities. The system houses created rub-
9 Perhaps this point expresses the single point of dif-
ference in praxis from Christianity and Judaism, Is-
lam, or Buddhism. Christianity posits that being 
shapes actions; many other religious ideas focus less 
on doctrine and more time on ritual or practice – be-
lieving that actions shape personhood.
rics (salary and promotions, star systems, re-
search  funds that  seem finite,  etc.)  that  pro-
mote these beliefs. So, we find ourselves, as 
with others, both alone and cynical – two less 
than  joyful  experiences.  Compounding  this 
state of affairs is the issue of time. When we 
come to feel alone, without hope of agency10 
(cynical), and without time to change things or 
think of how we might change things, we also 
become desperately unhappy – a deeply per-
sonal emotion that seems to permeate our lives 
as academics. 
Not all philosophies lead to despair. Accept-
ing that it is possible to live morally within a 
place is a reinstatement of hope in agency and 
in self-determination. As noted earlier, we are 
not even saying that our analysis is “true;” we 
are  only  saying  that  social  constructing  of 
knowledge in one way (as opposed to the oth-
er) will make us happier. One “philosophy of 
action” is found in Pope John Paul II’s work 
(both as Pope John Paul II and as Karl Wo-
jtyla). Pope John Paul II notes, “the moral life 
consists of attaining the truth in all our actions 
and  behavior”  (1993,  p.  91).  Pope  John  II 
(1993) also notes that the “most evident fea-
ture  in  an  act  of  will  is  the  efficacy  in  the 
awareness of the acting person in the act  of 
will” (p. 8). 
For John Paul II, this self-determined will is 
fundamental to ethical value and is the found-
ation of his “philosophy of action.” John Paul 
II highlights the Thomist distinction between 
“human acts” (acts we do with knowledge and 
10 It is interesting to attend a conference and note 
how derivative much of the work seems. That is, 
there is what seems an excessive linking (a sort of 
citation envy) to others’ (“key” thinkers’) work. 
What becomes interesting is that ideas cited were ac-
tually original ideas – those cited had creative ideas, 
but the presenters have not allowed themselves the 
same activity. If Northrup Frye (Creation and Recre-
ation, 1980) is correct, the human need to be creative 
has been co-opted by a sort of jigsaw puzzling of oth-
er people’s pieces and ideas into an idea. Perhaps we 
feel the inability to create and think for ourselves. If 
so, to what effect? Once again, agency escapes our 
work.
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free will) and “acts of the human” (things that 
simply happen to us) that we alluded to earli-
er.  To  expand,  when  something  happens  to 
someone, there is no experience of efficacy – 
no power. Only by altering one’s environment 
(a transitive action),  can one alter  his or her 
character (an intransitive action). 
A dog might  cover  a  bone and,  by newly 
creating a pile of dirt,  cause a person to trip 
and break an arm; but that dog can hardly be 
said to be evil.  On the other hand, a person 
who literally  shapes  the  physical  world  (for 
example, working on a levee to thwart flood-
ing)  and,  by doing so,  reshapes  dirt  to  save 
lives can be said to be acting in kindness and 
charity. That person is, according to John Paul 
II, also reshaping his values and his person in 
positive ways. The person has engaged in self-
determining  actions  that  are  chosen  because 
they are valued; and, because he does, he has 
become, as John Paul II (1993) notes, more of 
a  “somebody.”  This  act  is  willful,  and  this 
“drama of the will” has been central to human 
life throughout history and cultures (Wojtyla, 
1993, p. 275). What one might expect a reli-
gious leader  to say,  perhaps; but,  filled with 
common sense to us.
In religious language, not surprisingly Cath-
olic and Christian, John Paul II calls such ac-
tions  “love.”  And,  whether  talk  of  love  in 
philosophy makes one in the academy “goofy” 
or not, for such a ubiquitous concept it has, as 
Nota (1983, p. 195) notes, hardly been a topic 
of 20th century philosophers. We find little has 
changed in the 25 years since Nota made the 
piercing diagnosis. Complexity speaks little of 
love, or at least abstractly. Post-structural love 
is absent.11 Freud might talk of love, but his 
talk in our reading is biological and psycholo-
gical  –  to  be  studied  not  experienced.  The 
people  responsible  for  the  discovery  of  the 
double-helical  structure  of  DNA  in  1953  – 
Francis Crick, Rosalind Franklin, Linus Paul-
ing,  James  Watson  and  Maurice  Wilkins  – 
11 As Slavoj Zizek (1997) has put it: “Love Thy 
Neighbour? No thanks.”
suggest  that  the  body  itself  is  a  “lab”  for 
DNA. Where then is love here?
In  this  article,  we  have  spoken  about  en-
gagement, by which we mean being there with 
and for others. We will speak only a bit about 
love, since Pope John Paul II reminded us of 
it. We start by suggesting that love, however, 
is not so foreign to educational thought. It is 
fundamentally  embodied  in  the  willful  and 
ethical  actions  of  teachers  toward  students 
and,  in  some ways,  academics  towards  their 
own areas of study as in “I love to read in my 
area.”  Something  brought  us  to  this  place 
where we (once) “loved” teaching or thinking 
or researching or writing. There is an “oppos-
ite law to that of effort where effort may ex-
haust  itself  and  come  to  rest,  whereas  love 
either remains the same or increases” (Scheler, 
1957, p. 158). In other words, we love those 
things  (especially  teaching  as  a  scholarship 
among  the  professions)  that  we  engage 
without effort, although the things we love do 
require  work; but love shows itself  in doing 
what comes naturally for us to do. In all  its 
forms, love relates one to a “mutual relation-
ship among persons.”
Teachers as Transformational Intellectu-
als
Perhaps those who have read much of Henry 
Giroux will disagree, but we find Giroux’s 
writing about teacher agency and education-
al reform hopeful. In many ways, Giroux’s 
ideas  coincide  with our own ideas and we 
give the reviewers of this article, in the spirit 
of this  project,  full credit  for their  insights 
into this matter. We have chosen to engage 
Giroux’s work as a result of these reviewers’ 
suggestions.  When Giroux wrote  Teachers  
As  Intellectuals (1988),  he  began to  apply 
social theory to the everyday challenges of 
schooling  as  a  way  to  shape  practical  in-
sights within the work of critical pedagogy. 
In 1985 (a), Giroux wrote about teachers as 
“transformative  intellectuals.”  And,  al-
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though his writing is generally about K-12 
teachers, his ideas speak to our work at the 
academy.  Giroux  believes  an  educational 
crisis  exists  that  stems  from  the  disem-
powerment of teachers at all levels and their 
inability  to  shape  the  conditions  of  their 
work.  He  critiques  the  “proletarianization” 
of teacher work that reduces teachers to spe-
cialized  technicians  within  a  bureaucracy, 
and defends teachers as transformative intel-
lectuals whose scholarly practice is the ser-
vice of educating thoughtful, active citizens. 
Specifically,  Giroux  (1985b)  notes  the 
threat  of  instrumental  ideologies  that  em-
phasize  a  technocratic  approach to  teacher 
work  (we  have  noted  this  ideology  in  the 
work of academics who publish specific art-
icles for specific journals for the direct pur-
poses of academic recognition, remuneration 
and promotion). We agree with Giroux that 
academics  can  become  preoccupied  with 
“working the system” in technocratic and in-
strumental ways and, thus, in turn be worked 
by  the  system.  We  suspect  Giroux  would 
agree that,  when the work of academics is 
controlled  and structured – for example  in 
formalized judgments of who gets rewarded 
at the academy, work becomes slave to man-
agement  techniques  that  eliminate  critique 
about  how one lives  and works within the 
academy.  As  a  result,  the  theoretical  as-
sumption  that  guides  the  behavior  of  aca-
demics is control toward shaping consistent, 
predictable products. Thus, the deskilling of 
academics undermines the potential for crit-
ical  inquiry  and  engaged  academic  life  – 
what we believe Giroux calls in his writing 
“citizenship.” 
As a result, teaching, research and service 
(the holy trinity of sorts) becomes depoliti-
cized  acts  reduced to  “getting  ahead.”  But 
“getting  ahead”  means  “falling  behind” 
when the effect is to deskill or remove aca-
demics  from processes  of  deliberation  and 
reflection.  More  specifically,  such  actions 
militate  against  the  potential  richness  that 
occurs  when academics  with  different  his-
tories, experiences,  ideas, cultures, and tal-
ents discuss together their work. In this con-
text,  although  he  was  writing  almost  25 
years ago, Giroux argues that teachers must, 
as “transformative intellectuals,”  raise seri-
ous  questions  about  what  they  teach,  how 
they teach,  and the larger  goals  for  which 
they strive – including the purposes and con-
ditions of the academy.
Central  to becoming transformative intel-
lectuals is to combine the pedagogical  and 
the political. This means making critical re-
flection and action part of a fundamental so-
cial project to help develop a deep and abid-
ing  faith  in  the  struggle  to  overcome eco-
nomic, political and social injustices, and to 
further humanize ourselves for the struggle. 
Giroux’s  early 1980s rhetorical  flair  aside, 
we believe such work has current value. We 
disagree  only  with  the  extent  to  which 
Giroux (1988) implies teachers (and we add 
those within the academy) already are meta-
cognitive about their own agency. He writes 
as  if  teachers  understand the  hegemony in 
which they live and work: we believe most 
of us are less aware of this hegemony than 
he credits. We also believe that, before we 
can  aid  anyone  else,  we must  address  our 
own agency. Only then can our teaching be-
come political to the extent that it intervenes 
in  the  ethical  responsibility  of  incarnating 
the idea exposed by Paulo Freire – that life 
is conditioned but not determined.
Freire’s  critical  pedagogical  practice  did 
not transfer knowledge but created possibil-
ities,  encouraged  human  agency,  provided 
conditions  for  self-determination,  and 
struggled for a society (and we add a cul-
ture) that is both autonomous and democrat-
ic. Thus, we return to our hopeful pedagogy 
of  engagement  –what  Giroux would call  a 
pedagogy that embodies emancipatory polit-
ical  interests  that  sees  us  all  as  critical 
agents;  that makes  knowledge problematic; 
that utilizes critical and affirming dialogue; 
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and  that  works  for  a  qualitatively  better 
world. If Giroux is correct, and we believe 
he  is,  transformative  intellectuals  seek  to 
“voice”  learning  by  developing  a  critical 
language  that  outlines  the  problems  of 
everyday  life,  particularly  those  related  to 
pedagogical  experiences  connected  to  edu-
cational practice. 
We appreciate  Giroux’s  (2003) note  that 
transformative  intellectuals  must  develop a 
hopeful discourse that unites the language of 
critique with the language of possibility, all 
working toward the goal of change. Giroux 
(2003) notes Judith Butler’s suggestion that, 
for  her,  there  is  more  hope  in  the  world 
when people question the taken for granted, 
especially about their own humanity.  Hope 
links critical knowledge to democratic social 
change, and allows us to engage in critique, 
dialogue, and an open-ended struggle for so-
cial improvement.
Steps to Successful Pedagogies of  Engage-
ment
We  offer,  in  its  infancy,  some  suggestions 
about how we as academics might overcome 
our cynicism and lack of hope. Although we 
have  spent  perhaps  excessive  time  decon-
structing what we have called a pedagogy of 
disengagement,  we  will  not  speak  so  much 
about how to beat out disengagement. Instead, 
we will  metaphorically  accept  and engage a 
law of physics – two things may not occupy 
the same space at the same time. We under-
stand that  there  are  flaws with  this  physical 
metaphor, but in its infancy it seems fruitful. 
In  other  words,  we  believe  that  filling  our 
lives with a pedagogy of engagement will nat-
urally push away and ward off a pedagogy of 
domination.
In addition to this posture, we acknowledge 
and  recognize  those  insights  offered  by  re-
viewers of this article, who have engaged us in 
the very discourse we seek about our work as 
academics as well as what this article advoc-
ates– the re-scripting of our work through dia-
logue. Our reviewers rightfully questioned the 
simplistic  nature  of  our  naïve  propositions. 
And,  we  earlier  acknowledged  that  we  held 
the naïve hope that this article might engender 
further conversation about this important top-
ic. Indeed, it has. 
We  acknowledge  that  this  conversation  is 
longstanding;  and,  our  inadvertent  exclusion 
of others directly engaged in examining how 
academic work has changed over the past sev-
eral  decades  is  not  to  suggest  that  we  have 
claim to powerful new insights. Rather the op-
posite. We humbly recognize the work of oth-
er academics problematizing academic despair 
and reformulating new visions as “purveyors 
of  warranted  hope”  (Walker,  2006).  As  au-
thors, we think of the work of the American 
Association of University Professors and other 
organizations  of  comparable  stature  that  are 
addressing the issues posed in this article. 
Our plan calls for a 14-Step Program that, as 
imagined,  does  not  cherish  Step  One of  the 
famous  12-Step Program that  says  “I  accept 
that I am not in control …” The steps are not 
necessarily sequential but rather processural.
Step  One:  We  acknowledge  a  profound 
sense of our own good fortune and an active 
gratitude for the opportunity we have as aca-
demics. We see our place in the academic life 
as an unearned gift in the sense of an entitle-
ment,  and we accept that being an academic 
carries a responsibility.
Step Two: We act with compassion towards 
others.  Compassion  (from  the  Latin)  means 
“suffering with” – feeling empathy, identifica-
tion,  and sharing the experience  of life  with 
those with whom we work.
Step Three: We actively “name” our opposi-
tions to systemic domination, and by doing so 
act in ways to move us towards justice (with 
colleagues, for example, and for our students). 
We seek to engage goals that promote work-
ing and learning in partnership or interdepend-
ence  as  opposed  to  independence.  (As  we 
have done here together as authors and grate-
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fully  utilizing  the  insights  of  our  reviewers, 
we must teach, research, write, and serve to-
gether.)
Step  Four:  Our  work  must  emphasize  en-
gaged praxis, not intellectual piety. That is, we 
accept the responsibility of an “ivory tower” 
responsible to a culture and a society.
Step Five: We must talk more to each other. 
Our  impulse  must  be  toward  transformation 
through dialogue – to help change those and 
ourselves in pursuit of a better life.
Step  Six:  Our work must  emphasize  com-
munity (common unity). Community is inher-
ently social  and political,  involving practices 
such as demonstrating respect for each other, 
responsibility  and  integrity  in  relationships, 
and service.
Step Seven: We must engage in cooperative 
acts committed to the long-term, with an act-
ive recognition that omni-competence is short-
sighted.  And, hard as it might be to do in a 
system that actively prizes omni-competence, 
we remain committed to working in partner-
ships and community even when the system 
creates little space for these.
Step Eight: Individuals (including ourselves) 
must  be  liberated  (changed  or  transformed) 
from  inherent  and  violent  patterns  of  self-
seeking  in  their  professional  and  ultimately 
personal lives. This definition of violence in-
cludes all forms of deception, abuse, and ma-
nipulation of others for one’s own purposes. 
Such violence stems from alienation and fear, 
and is endemic to all humans and cultures – 
including  (perhaps  especially)  from those  in 
control who fear losing control.
Step Nine: We must act to remove fatalistic 
traditions  and  actions  that  stifle  or  repress 
hope and work to dismantle oppressive hier-
archical social structures that create and main-
tain slavery and codependence. Teachers and 
students alike must learn and practice self-re-
spect and respect for others.
Step Ten: Activities that effectively improve 
the  quality  of  life  for  teachers  and  students 
must be vigorously discussed and introduced. 
The  goals  we  seek  must  be  “incarnated”  in 
ways  students  can  understand.  (All  students, 
we suggest, understand patience, truth, caring 
actions, service, relationship, modesty, and re-
spect.) We must engage students in open and 
constant  evaluation  of  those  shared  goals  – 
both as a way to improve our actions and as a 
way to formulate our visions.
Step Eleven: We must forgive ourselves and 
others when we all fail to live by an engaged 
pedagogy and therefore ethically. Because we 
are human,  often our  own perceived self-in-
terest blocks our noble intentions and we are 
guilty  of  self-centered  thoughts  and  actions. 
There are always frustrating constraints on in-
dividual efforts that seem to be self-defeating 
even when well-intended. This “law of unin-
tended effects” [the warning against disorder – 
that almost any human action has unintended 
consequences or unexpected results]  reminds 
us that, any time we do things, there may be 
unforeseen effects  and, as teachers,  we must 
beware – not so as to halt action but as to cri-
tique and evaluate our goals.
Step Twelve: We must not oversimplify the 
complexity  of  social  or  institutional  systems 
and exalt an individual’s ability to triumph – 
especially  first  attempts  – against  systematic 
complexity. We know too well the deep nature 
of  systematic  violence,  the  power  of  hege-
mony, and transformations of our own abilit-
ies to weigh actions. Even intents come slowly 
and often amid much failure. We are all com-
plicit  with  self-fulfilling  presumptions  that 
govern our social institutions and condition us 
as individuals.
Step Thirteen: We must understand that the 
system  constrains  both  the  ‘rich’  and  the 
‘poor’ who inhabit that system. The only op-
tion for both seems to be to use the system to 
“beat the system.” Our graduate students, for 
example,  come  to  jealously  seek  and  even 
emulate  what  seems to be our affluent,  aca-
demic lifestyle  – but,  as noted by recent  re-
search  that  underscores  the  poverty of  spirit 
within the academy by pointing out how many 
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of us simply are unhappy in our work, we all 
fall  into a too-easy compliance  with what is 
basically an unjust system that exacerbates our 
own – and ultimately – others’ poverty.
Step Fourteen: Finally, we must change our 
orientation  toward  academic  life  and  work. 
For  teachers  and  others,  there  has  been  a 
lingering suspicion that too much emphasis on 
theory  might  encourage  and  produce  an  af-
fected piety without ethical action or without 
obedience to our nobler intentions.  We must 
engage in praxis.
Conclusion
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle  ~334-
323 BCE [1989] develops a theory of the good 
life  (eudiamonia)  for  humans.  “Eudiamonia” 
is perhaps best translated as flourishing or liv-
ing  well  and  doing  well.  So  when  Aristotle 
speaks of the good life as the happy life,  he 
does not mean that the good life is merely one 
of feeling happy or amused. Rather, the good 
life for a person is the active life of function-
ing well in those ways that are essential  and 
unique to humans.
In  this  article,  we  have  tried  to  make  the 
case  that  the culture  of  the academy is  sick 
and needs to be healed. As a result, those of us 
who are living there are unhappy. The pervas-
ive unhappiness is the result of a moral  dis-
ease perpetrated by both the unconscious indi-
vidual  (the  academic  as  person)  and  the 
academy itself.  Both parties are at  fault.  We 
have pointed out some examples of this illness 
– self-focus,  lack of creativity,  lack of com-
munity,  conflicts  over  material  resources, 
deeply-embedded competition, deep cynicism, 
and a lack of vision for positive change. We 
are suggesting that the culture of the academy 
can be reclaimed and have given some simple 
examples of how that might be done on a per-
sonal and interpersonal level.
Although this article is only a beginning, we 
hope that we might encourage a conversation 
about our places of work, about our vocation, 
and about how we might flourish within insti-
tutional spaces of teaching learning and know-
ledge creation. We appreciate the attention our 
work  has  been  given  by  reviewers  charged 
with reading and evaluating this work towards 
its  inclusion  in  a  refereed  journal.  Although 
we wish to engage the hearts and minds of our 
readers with the possibility of a new way of 
doing our work and the “reclamation of lost 
ideals,” as one of our reviewers has suggested, 
our suggestions for systemic change are lim-
ited to simple, although not simplistic, sugges-
tions. We believe that any change must be cul-
tural change – this includes changing our (1) 
language – the way we talk to each other and 
the words we use, (2) values and worldviews – 
not focusing on lesser values that are material 
but, instead, focusing on higher values, (3) our 
norms – the rules we have that help us relate 
to each other and the material world, (4) the 
way we live and behave – so as to build and 
sustain community, and (5) the way we create 
and use artifacts – building and creating “tools 
for conviviality.”
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